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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

VALLEY BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

F I R S T SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH, N.A.,
Defendant and Respondent.

13852

RESPONDENTS BRIEF

STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
This is a case arising under the Uniform Commercial Code contesting the validity of a charge back made
by an intermediary bank on the account of a depositing
bank after oral notice of dishonor,
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After trial before the Court, the District Judge,
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The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment for
the defendant. The Court found that the plaintiff received oral notice of dishonor and that oral notice was
sufficient notification under Utah Code Annotated,
§ 70A-4-212 (1968).
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Respondent prays that the judgments and orders
of the low court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about August 18, 1970, Bernard M. Tanner and Kent Lundquist executed a check in the amount
of Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00)
payable to DataCap International, Inc. and drawn on
the Guarantee Bank and Trust Company of Chicago.
The check was endorsed by Tanner for DataCap and
deposited in the DataCap account in Valley Bank and
Trust Company (hereinafter "Valley Bank"). Valley
Bank thus became the depository bank within the meaning of Section 70A-4-105(a). Valley Bank credited the
$4,500.00 to the account of DataCap on August 18,
1970.
Valley Bank then forwarded the check to First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. (hereinafter "First Security") for collection. First Security thus became an intermediary bank within the meaning of Section 70A4-105(b).
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First Security made a provisional credit on the account of Valley Bank and Trust Company and forwarded the check for collection to Guarantee Bank and
Trust Company, which thus became the payor bank
within the meaning of Section 70A-4-105(d).
The payor bank returned the item to First Security on or about August 27, 1970, because the check required another signature. Valley Bank thereafter
received the original and contacted its customers. After
obtaining the necessary signature, the item was redeposited in DataCap's account at Valley Bank on August
27, 1970, and the item was forwarded through First
Security to the payor bank in Chicago.
First Security was notified on September 8, 1970
that the item was being returned for insufficient funds.
The item was mailed by the Chicago bank to First Security, but the item was lost in the mails and was never
returned to First Security or Valley Bank.
On September 9, 1970, First Security gave oral
notice of dishonor to Valley Bank. First Security thereupon reversed the provisional credit given Valley Bank.
ARGUMENT
T H E U T A H UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE E X P R E S S L Y A L L O W S A COLLECTI N G B A N K TO G I V E O R A L N O T I C E O F
DISHONOR.
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First Security, acting as a collecting bank, assumes
several statutory obligations. Utah Code Annotated
§ 70A-4-202 (1968) provides:
"A collecting bank must use reasonable care
in (a) presenting an item or sending in for
presentment; and (b) sending notice of dishonor • • ."
Section 70A-3-508 of the Code defines notice of dishonor:
"(1) Notice of dishonor may be given to any
person who may be liable on the instrument...
(3) notice may be given in any reasonable
manner. It may be oral or written, and in any
terms which identify the instrument and state
that it has been dishonored. A misdescription
which does not mislead the party notified does
not vitiate the notice. Sending the instrument
bearing a stamp, ticket or writing stating that
acceptance or payment has been refused or
sending a notice of debit with respect to the instrument is sufficient." [Emphasis added]
By virtue of Section 70A-4-104(3), Section 70A-3-508
is expressly made applicable to the provisions of Article

"(3) The following definitions in other chapters apply to this chapter:
*

#

*
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Notice of Dishonor — Section 70A-3-508"
*

*

#

Therefore, the Codes makes it clear that a collecting bank
satisfies its obligation of reasonable care if it gives oral
notice of dishonor to a depository bank. The Code further provides that if the collecting bank has given such
notice that it is not liable to prior parties. Section 70A4-211(2) provides:
"If before its midnight deadline, the collecting bank properly dishonors a remittance
check or authorization . . . the collecting bank
is not liable..."
The trial court in this case found that First Security gave oral notice of dishonor to Valley Bank on September 9, 1970, well within its midnight deadline.
(R. 17) I t is well recognized by this Court that findings
of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are
clearly erroneous. Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Co.,
3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 355 (1955). Bummell v.
Bailey, 7 Utah 2d 137, 320 P.2d 653 (1958). Valley
Bank has not demonstrated or even argued that the
findings of fact in this case are erroneous; and, consequently, the trial court's finding must be sustained.
Once oral notice of dishonor is given, First Security
is not liable to Valley Bank in the event of dishonor,
and it has the right to "charge back" or reverse Valley
Bank's provisional credit. Section 70A-4-212 of the
Code provides the right to charge back:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Right of charge-back or refund. — (1) If
a collecting bank has made provisional settlement . . . and itself fails . . . to receive settlement for the item , . . the bank may revoke the
settlement given by it, charge back the amount
of any credit given for the item . . . whether or
not it is able to return the items if by its midnight deadline or within a longer reasonable
time after it learns the facts it returns the item
or sends notification of the facts .. " (Emphasis added).
The "fact" in this case requiring notification is that
the item was dishonored by the payor bank for insufficient funds. I n other words, First Security must "send"
Valley Bank "notice of dishonor" before midnight of the
next business day following the receipt of notice from
the payor. This requirement was strictly complied with.
Section 3-508, expressly made applicable to Article
IV, provides that such notice may be either oral or
written. Since oral notice was given by First Security, it
has the right at any time thereafter to charge back the
provisional credit given to Valley Bank. The fact that
the original was never returned became irrelevant, because Valley Bank had the right, upon receipt of oral
notice from First Security, to enter a charge back
against the account of its customer, DataCap.
The facts contained in the record amply support
the court's findings concerning notice and also comply
with the statutory requirements outlined above. The
clerk for First Security, Carla Manning, testified that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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notice was given by telephone to a clerk at Valley Bank
(R. 47). Her testimony was supported by the memorandum of such calls maintained by First Security in its
course of business (Exhibit 6-D). Witnesses for Valley
Bank could not deny receipt of such oral notice. Consequently, Valley Bank was clearly placed on notice by
such call that the check had been dishonored and that
it must take appropriate steps to deal with its customer,
DataCap, for collection or charge back.
Valley Bank argues that no right of charge back
exists because First Security did not properly dishonor
the item and submits that written notice is required. I n
support of that argument, Valley Bank relies on Section 70A-4-212(2) which provides:
" (2) Within the time and manner prescribed in
this Section and § 70A-4-301, an intermediary
. . . bank . . . may return an unpaid item directly to the depository bank . . .
Valley Bank then refers to Section 70A-4-301 which
provides that:
". . . the payor bank may revoke the settlement and recover any payment, if before it has
made final payment and before its midnight
deadline it (a) returns the item or (b) sends
written notice of dishonor for non-payment if
the item . . . is otherwise unavailable for return . . ." (Emphasis added).
Valley Bank's reliance on the written requirement
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of Section 4-301 is misplaced. Section 4-301 provides
for the collection of items by payor banks. I t has no
application to collecting banks except through Section
4-212(2). Section 4-212(2) is merely an election that
may be exercised to return an unpaid item directly to
the depository bank and is utilized to avoid the unnecessary handling by intermediary banks. Comment 4 of the
Official Comments notes the purpose of the election
provided by Section 4-212(2):
4. "Subsection (2) is an affirmative provision
for so-called "direct returns." This is a new
practice that is currently in the process of developing in a few sections of the country. Its
purpose is to speed up the return of unpaid
items by avoiding handling by one or more intermediate banks. The subsection is bracketed
because the practice is not yet well established
and some bankers and bank lawyers would
prefer to let the practice develop by agreement.
The contention is made that substantive rights
between banks may be affected, e.g. available
set of fs, but proponents contend advantages of
direct returns outweigh possible detriments.
However, if the subsection were omitted, the
election to use direct returns would be on the
depository bank and it would probably be
necessary for that bank to specifically authorize direct returns with each outgoing letter."
(Emphasis Added).
I t is clear in this case that there was no attempt to
return the dishonored check directly to the depository
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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bank (Valley Bank). Consequently, there was no exercise of the election. Section 4-212 is, therefore, not applicable to this case and cannot be used to create a duty
imposed on payor banks to send written notice of dishonor in direct returns. The provisions applicable to
collecting banks make it clear that written or oral notice
is sufficient notice of dishonor. See Sections 70A-4-202,
70A-3-508, 70A-4-212.
Valley Bank has further argued that the Code contemplates written notice of dishonor through the Code's
definition of "send" found in Section 70A-1-201(38).
However, the preface of Section 201 provides that those
definitions are:
"subject to additional definitions contained in
the subsequent chapters of this act which are
applicable to specific chapters or parts thereof."
Further, that section specifically notes that the definitions "are applicable unless the context otherwise requires."
In this case, the specific Article IV sections, as well
as the context of those provisions, make it clear that oral
notice of dishonor may be sent. When written notice is
necessary, the Code expressly provides. Section 4-301 (1)
(b) describes when a payor bank "sends written notice of
dishonor," while Section 4-210(1) indicates when a collecting bank must send "written notice that the bank
holds the item for acceptance or payment." However,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in all other situations, oral notice is sufficient. Section
4-212 provides that a collecting bank may "charge back"
if it, among other things, "sends notification of the
facts." Similarly, Section 4-301(2) and Section 4-302
refer to situations where the payor bank "sends notice
of dishonor." Section 4-503 discusses when a bank must
"notify its transferor of the dishonor."
Valley Bank urges this court to imply written
notice where the Code has failed to do so. Article I V
of the Code has indicated in which specific circumstances
written notice is required. I t is a well-recognized principal of statutory construction that the use of specific
words connotes an intent to exclude that which is not
specifically mentioned. Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc.
v. Public Service Commimon, 21 Utah 2d 377, 455 P.2d
990 (1968); Hansen v. Board of Education, 101 Utah
15, 116 P.2d 936 (1941). Since the Code in this case
has indicated when written notice is required, the absence of any requirement for written notice in other situations must be considered as an indication that the
Code draftsmen and the Utah Legislature did not intend to require written notice in those situations.
Even if the Code did require written notice, the
Code recognizes that such requirements may be modified by agreement. Section 70A-4-103(l) provides:
" (1) The effect of the provisions of this chapter may be varied by agreement except that
no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to exercise ordinary care or can limit the
measure of damages for such lack of failure;
but the parties may by agreement determine
the standards by which such responsibility is
to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable."
Section 4-103 makes it clear that even if written
notice were required in the Code, the parties by agreement could establish a contrary practice or custom if not
manifestly unreasonable. I n the present case, it is the
custom or practice of the banking community to give
oral notice of dishonor on items over $1,000.00. (R. 17)
I t must be emphasized that Valley Bank has not required or even requested a deviation from that policy,
either before the initiation of this lawsuit or subsequent
to it. That practice must, therefore, constitute tacit
agreement by Valley Bank that oral notification is sufficient.
CONCLUSION
The Code has clearly and expressly indicated that
oral notice is sufficient "notification of dishonor" for
collecting banks. I t has further indicated those specific
circumstances when written notice is required. First
Security received its notice of dishonor on September
8, 1970. Pursuant to the standards of reasonable care
and the statutory authority conferred by Section
70A-3-508, First Security gave oral notice of dishonor
to Valley Bank on September 9, 1970. Valley Bank
received this notice and, consequently, First Security
had the right to charge back the provisional credit given
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Valley Bank. The trial court properly ruled on the basis
of substantial evidence that First Security had the right
to make such a charge back, and that determination
should be upheld. Respondent, therefore, requests that
this court affirm the lower court's judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & N E B E K E R

By
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Don B.Allen

ames W. Gilson
Attorneys for Respondent
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